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1. CMEA: "Common Plan" versus "Common Market" 
The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, 
also known as Comecon~), set up in 1949 by the Soviet Union 
and the European countries which had adopted a Soviet-type 
socialist system after the War, was partly the formal 
expression of economic solidarity within the newly formed 
bloc, partly a response to the challenge of the Organisation 
for European Economic cooperation, set up in 1948 by 16 West 
European nations. 
CMEA is an economic community sui generis. It is 
not a common market because no country has direct access to 
internal markets (if any) in the other countries. It is not 
a customs union because in all these countries state 
monopoly of foreign trade and compensatory taxes and 
1. Paper presented at the Seminar on "Horizonte de la 
Union Europea 1992", organised by the Association of 
European Journalists and the European University Institute, 
Florence, at the Menendez Pelayo International University, 
Santander (Spain), 12-16 September 1988. The first two 
sections of this paper draw extensively on Maciejewski and 
Nuti, 1985; the author has also benefitted greatly from 
discussions with the participants in a Workshop which he 
held on this general topic at the EUI, Florence, on 30 
August-2 September 1988, and in particular with Marie 
Lavigne and Klaus Schneider, though they should not be 
associated with any of the views, errors or omissions to be 
found in this paper. 
z.. Comecon is a Western label, more euphonic than CMEA· 
(SEV in the Russian initials) but avoided in Eastern Europe 
because it originated in Cold War sovietological literature; 
it is associated with Cominform and Comintern and it leaves 
out the element of "assistance" (van Brabant, 1988); this is 
why "CMEA" is now preferred in economic literature and used 
in this paper. Founder members were Albania, Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR, 
joined 'in 1950 by the GDR; Albania's membership lapsed in 
1961, Mongolia joined in 1962, Cuba in 1972 and Vietnam in 
1978. Forms of associate membership have been given to 
Yugoslavia (1966), Finland (1973), Iraq and Mexico (1975) 
and Angola (1976). The six East European full members of 
CMEA are often designated as the EE6, while EE7 includes 
also the Soviet Union. 
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subsidies make custom duties a purely formal and irrelevant 
complication. It is not a monetary union because individual 
currencies are separateiy managed and rates of exchange have 
a perfunctory role, while the so-called "transferable 
rouble" is neither transferable without prior agreement nor 
a rouble (in that it does not lead to a direct and 
unconditional claim on goods and services even in the Soviet 
Union). There is no factor mobility (except for technical 
knowledge and minor and controlled labour movements) even 
within CMEA; there is no policy integration in the sense of 
concertation of current policy instruments. There is, of 
course, a strong measure of political integration, because 
of the similarity and indeed the near identity of their 
political systems as well as Soviet hegemony but, although 
the CMEA is used to maintain and consolidate political 
integration, this pre-dates the establishment of CMEA and is 
not a stated intention of that community; there is no 
provision for supranational authorities and technically each 
member is not bound by decisions with which it disagrees 
(CMEA Charter, 1961; see Marer and Montias, 1981; 
Maciejewski and Nuti, 1985). 
International economic integration is best 
understood as a pattern of resource allocation which would 
not be altered ·if national borders were removed~. Thus a 
Co~~on Market for goods and production factors, with 
transactions conducted competitively with convertible 
currencies under policy coordination, is not a necessary 
element of economic- integration, which can be achieved- in 
theory - through a Common Plan. This is, at the risk of 
oversimplification, precisely the nature of CMEA, i.e. a 
commitment to planned integration of both current and future 
trade, between state monopolies of foreign trade, operating 
in economies which are centrally planned through 
administrative means, along the Soviet-type model. In 
addition, CMEA has imposed a restriction on the type of 
integration to be achieved, by trying to establish 
infrasectoral rather than sectoral specialisation, according 
to the principles of a "socialist" international division of 
labour aimed at avoiding the polarisation between primary 
producers and industrialised countries. 
Within this framework, CMEA commitment to economic 
integration could be regarded as intermediate between that 
of members of the EEC and of the European Free Trade 
Association. Namely, CMEA has a higher degree of 
cooperation and integration than EFTA countries intended, 
and in this respect is closer to the European Community; at 
the same time CMEA, like EFTA, has never adopted 
supranational objectives of the nature envisaged in the 
Treaty of Rome (though in the early 1960s there were 
a. Such a pattern is never unique, not only for the all 
the reasons causing multiple solutions in the theory of 
general economic equilibrium, but because it is conditional 
on a particular policy of regional development. 
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attempts at establishing them); CMEA members "maintain 
individual tariffs and trade policies towards third parties 
and undertake obligations only with respect to their mutual 
trade" (Kaser and Ransom, 1969). 
2. The evolution of CMEA 
The implementation of this general design has 
progressed at a changing pace over the last forty years (see 
Robson, 1984). Until the mid-1950s CMEA cooperation was very 
limited. Pre-war trade flows were drastically diverted from 
Western Europe towards the Soviet Union (though some 
diversion was the reinstatement of pre-1917 economic links), 
but this occurred independently of Council activity, through 
the year-by-year bilateral exchange of surplus outputs. In 
1955-1962 there was a determined attempt at greater CMEA 
coordination and integration, with the emergence of joint 
enterprises and joint investment projects, the setting up of 
several sectoral and functional Standing Commissions1, the 
publication of the CMEA Charter and of the "Basic principles 
of international socialist division of labour" (1960). 
These developments under Krushchev's leadership were also 
stimulated by rival developments in Western Europe, with the 
birth and rise of the European Economic Community and EFTA. 
From the early 1960s to the end of the decade CMEA 
activity stagnated; this was due to the lack of further 
progress in the multeralisation of intrabloc trade in spite 
of the setting up of the International Bank for Economic 
Cooperation (1963), to the generalised slowdown of economic 
activity throughout the area, resistence to supranational 
planning by Romania supported by Czechoslovakia and Hungary, 
and experimentation with economic reform which were widely 
regarded as the necessary prerequisite of further 
integration; infrabloc trade stagnated though more joint 
projects were launched. 
The 19.70s saw generalised opening to foreign trade 
within the Council, with the launching of the fifteen and 
twenty years "Comprehensive Programme for Socialist Economic 
Integration" (1971), an International Investment Bank 
(1971), the adoption in 1975 of the long-term special 
purpose programmes for cooperation (1978 and 1979). The oil 
crisis created a unique opportunity for CMEA, as an energy 
self-sufficient economic bloc; CMEA pricing criteria for 
intra-bloc trade, linking prices to a moving average of 
world prices, stabilised the intra-bloc price of Soviet 
1- These Commissions were set up to cover areas such as 
agriculture, building and construction, chemicals, coal, 
research coordination, currency and finance, economic 
questions, electric power etc., with headquarters in Moscow 
and other Eastern European capital cities. 
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trade~ but by and large CMEA countries did not adjust to the 
oil crisis either individually or collectively. They 
maintained domestic absorption resorting to international 
borrowing, boosting East-West trade until the early 1980s, 
when the exhaustion of credit and the burden of debt induced 
a drastic intra-bloc retreat. 
At present intra-CMEA trade is dominated by the 
decline in Soviet export earnings and terms of trade, due to 
the delayed diffusion of oil price fall to USSR oil exports, 
which constrains the growth of intra CMEA trade and 
because of its unplanned and uncertain nature - leads to 
unexpected trade surpluses (especially for Hungary, 3bn TR 
last year) embarassingly large because they cannot be offset 
against parallel payments deficits with Western countries. 
In practice CMEA countries have achieved a degr~e 
of economic security in coordinating their internal supply 
of energy - through Soviet oil and Polish cocd -·and raw 
materials, and a high degree of integration as measured by 
the share of intra-bloc trade (which rose from 9% in 1948 to 
52% in 1981). However CMEA economies are comparatively much 
less open to trade than countries at a similar level of 
economic development; in the planning process exports are 
treated as a necessary evil" for obtaining essential 
imports, instead of opportunities for enhancing efficiency 
and· productivity. Also, the generalised policy of high 
investment and accelerated industrialisation, with emphasis 
on heavy industry, coupled with the anti-diversification 
bias of so called "socialist division of labour" (see 
previous section) has given all East European countries a 
somewhat similar structure, preventing the rise of 
complementarities. Further integration has been limited 
also by other systemic factors: bilateral bias in the 
absence of convertible national currencies (let alone a 
common currency), not only by country but also by commodity 
groups according to the degree of their "softness" in 
international trade (van Brabant ,· 1973); the inertia built 
into administrative central planning, combined with the 
rigidities of economies characterised by persistent excess 
Q. Intra-CMEA planned trade refers to an average of 
world prices. In 1958 the rule known as the "Bucharest 
principle" was agreed, whereby intra-CMEA prices were fixed 
for a five-year period, at average world prices for the 
previous five years. In 1975 this was replaced by the 
"Moscow principle", whereby prices, on a moving five-ye<}r 
average, were to be revised every year (except for 1975 when 
a three year 1972-1974 average was used). With the drastic 
rise in oil price Soviet oil lagging behind world prices 
gave rise to a gain for CMEA oil importers, which many 
regarded as an implicit subsidy (for instance, Marrese-
Vanous, 1983). However the alleged subsidy was more in the 
nature of a loss for the fulfilment of a long term contract; 
in any case the same price formula is now making Soviet oil 
gradually catch up with and exceed the spot price. 
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demand for both goods and labour; mutual fear of 
exploitation in the face of transactions not taking place at 
world prices; inability to appropriate fully the returns on 
joint investments; political limitations to the movements of 
labour. 
The current wave of political renewal and radical 
economic reform which is taking place in the Soviet Union 
with Gorbachev's perestroika and in most East European 
countries (with the exception of Romania and the GDR) is 
making itself felt within CMEA. First, a major 
reorganisation is under way, with the liquidation of many of 
the "Standing or Permanent Commissions" through which CMEA 
cooperation was administratively articulated; these 
Commissions can be regarded as the international equivalent 
of national Branch Ministries, also reduced in number in the 
process of national reform. Second, direct links are being 
established directly at the enterprises level in CMEA 
countries, with exporters bein~allowed to retain ·some of 
the export revenue and to convert it into commodities 
without prior administrative arrangements; this development, 
which has been agreed bilaterally between the Soviet Union 
and both Czechoslovakia and Hungary, paves the way towards 
multilateral convertibility. Third, for the first time in 
thirty years, there is now talk of a "unified socialist 
market".§., spurred both by the development of domestic 
markets and ·by the example of the EC "Internal Market" 
expected by 1992. 
3. CMEA-EC relations: three phases 
Relations between the European Community and the 
CMEA "state trading countries" (which is their official EC 
designation) have gone through three main phases. The first 
phase goes from 1957.to about 1971 and is characterised by 
CMEA "total rejection of the European Community as something 
which could develop into a new subject of international law" 
(Seeler Report, 1986). This attitude was embodied in 17 
theses on the Common Market, published by Kommunist in 1957, 
and reiterated in the 32 theses on imperialist integration 
in Western Europe published by Pravda in 1962 (though it was 
also stated there that its existence did not rule out 
Q. The pressing need for such a unified· market was 
advocated for instance by the Polish Prime Minister Zbigniev 
Messer at the CMEA Summit meeting in Prague in July 1988 
(FT, 7 July 1988). 
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cooperation between the two blocs1). This was the result of 
a miscalculation about the degree of permanence of the EEC, 
and of the crude application of marxist-leninist theories of 
capital concentration and imperialism. 
The second phase in EEC-CMEA relations goes from 
1972 to 1984. This is characterised by CMEA expressions of 
interest in a formal trade agreement with the European 
Community, and by EC willingness to hold trade negotiations 
only with individual members of the CMEA. The change of 
attitude on the CMEA side, first indicated in a March 1972 
statement by Brezhnev, was associated with detente, the 
ambitious CMEA 1971 programme and probably also apprehension 
at the adverse effects of the European Community on CMEA 
exports~. The EC, having acquired in 1974 full competence 
for commercial policy, which implied termination of existing 
bilateral agreements concluded by its members, proposed 
individual trade negotiations to all state-trading 
countriesl. CMEA proposed reciprocal trade relations, 
industrial technological .and scientific cooperation, eo-
signature by member states, the establi~hment of a joint 
committee to consider future relations (February 1976); the 
EC counterproposal specifically excluded all these issues 
but included exchange of information, standardisation and 
environmental questions (November 1976). The Community 
would not accept "the CMEA becoming a kind of intermediary 
between the EEC and individual CMEA countries, with power, 
through the agreement between the two organisations, not 
only to lay down guidelines for trade policy but also to 
1. Already in the 1960s some East European countries 
approached the EC with a view to alleviate the impact of 
CAP, which the EC has done slowly and minimally (this was 
probably a blessing in disguise for food-deficit countries 
like Poland, but an obstacle to a genuine comparative 
advantage for Bulgaria and Hungary). 
~. The establishment of the EEC caused a modest trade 
diversion away from CMEA countries, estimated at 4 per cent 
of the value (at 1959 prices) of the European Community's 
imports from the CMEA in 1970; the effect was stronger for 
manufacturing exports, equivalent to 10 per cent on the same 
basis (Balassa 1975; see also Balassa 1967). The first 
enlargement of the EEC appears to have produced stronger net 
trade diverting effects in,industrial products, estimated at 
16 per cent of the value. of the enlarged EEC in 1970 
(Yannopoulos, 1985). Net effects were stronger in food and 
drinks, chemicals and "othe'r manufacture~"· 
1. The issues involved: MFN treatment (which however is 
not an issue, having been granted by the EC to all Eastern 
European countries), quotas, agricultural trade, safeguard 
mechanisms and credits (Pinder 1988). 
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supervise the content and execution of Community agreements 
with individual countries" (Maslen, 1987). 
This divergence led to protracted and inconclusive 
EC-CMEA negotiations, which were suspended in 1980, though 
direct sectoral agreements were reached with individual CMEA 
countries, on steel, textiles and agricultural products, 
with Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and above all Romania (which 
signed a comprehensive package of agreements and was given 
preferential status as a less developed country).l.Q .. 
The third phase in EC-CMEA relations began with 
the CMEA Summit of June 1984, whose Final Declaration 
indicated willingness to sign an EC-CMEA agreement aimed at 
promoting the further development of relations between 
member countries; this was followed in October 1984 by a 
proposal to reopen negotiations, without insisting on a 
trade agreement between the two organisations. In further 
statements, contacts and negotiations, the EC reiterated the 
approach of developing closer relations with CMEA "parallel" 
to the "normalisation" of relations 'between the EC and the 
seven CMEA member states11. Already. by 1986 CMEA 
negotiators effectively accepted the EC "parallel" approach; 
but a further disagreement arose, over the status of Berlin, 
which delayed an agreement but was resolved eventually by 
means of a compromise formula~z. A Joint Declaration was 
1Q. Trade restrictions came down not only for steel and 
textiles covered by special agreements, but also for other 
products (for instance, in 1985 the EC removed 200 
restrictions on Romanian products) but there are still quite 
a few still in force. 
ll. "Normalisation" here was understood to mean 
"willingness to negotiate an.overall trade agre~ment with 
each country, the accreditation of diplomatic missions with 
the Community and the abandonment of anti-community 
disruptive action in international organisations" ·: (Seeler 
Report, 1988). · 
~~. All EC agreements have a territorial clause about 
their applicability to all of its territory, which includes 
West Berlin;' in agreements with the EC individual CMEA 
countries (except Romania) had added a unilateral 
declaration , acknowledged by the EC though not part of the 
agreement - that the territorial clause did not alter the 
status of Berlin as agreed in the Four-Power Agreement of 3 
September 1971. This compromise at firs~ was not acceptable_ 
to the Sovi&t Union, wishing to single out Berlin's position 
in any EC-CMEA agreement. This divergence delayed an 
agreement but in ·the end was resolved by means of the same 
formula (except for Romania who, not having raised this 
reservation in its own bilateral agreements with the EC 
could not raise it at this stage). 
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signed eventually in Luxemburg on 25 June 1988, which 
amounts to a pact of mutual formal recognition by the two 
trading blocs and has laid' the foundations for further 
bilateral relations between the European Community and 
individual CMEA countries. 
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4. The EC ''parallel" approach 
The 'Ec "parallel" approach, to the CMEA on minor 
general questions and to individual CMEA members on 
substantive questions of trade and cooperation, was due to 
two main factors~: 
i) the CMEA lack of common trade policy and indeed 
its inability to enforce the terms of an agreement on its 
own members through its own legislation, i.e. CMEA lack of 
competence in trade negotiations (see above, section 1). In 
practice an EC-CMEA trade agreement, if it had been 
concluded with the unanimous agreement of CMEA members, 
would have carried enough· weight to bind CMEA member 
countries as much (or indeed as little) as any individual 
trade agreement; in fact over the period 1964-85 cooperation 
agreements have been signed by CMEA with Yugoslavia, 
Finland, Iraq, Mexico, Nicaragua and Mozambique. Formally, 
however, the EC objection was unimpeachable. 
ii) .. the political preoccupation that the Soviet 
dominant role within CMEA ·would a.ffect excessively EC 
relations with the other members of CMEA (especially the 
EE6); such a preoccupation is said to have been shared by at 
least some of the other CMEA members themselves. The Seeler 
Report makes this point and contrasts the Soviet position 
within CMEA with the position of the other superpower, the 
United States, which does not belong to the EC. This is 
seen as the reason for diversifying EC relations with the 
USSR and the EE6. 
The long time taken by the negotiations between 
the two trading b~ocs and the EC success in implementing its 
"parallel" approach are best explained with reference to 
some structural aspects of trade be~ween members of EC and 
CMEA. Namely, there are two basic asymmetries: 
i) EC-CMEA trade represents a small fraction of EC 
trade turnover, of tne order of magnitude of its trade with 
Sweden or Switzerland,· whereas its share of CMEA trade 
turnover is four or five times larger; this enabled the EC 
to negotiate from a position of strength. 
ii) Trade with the EC is more important for the 
EE6 than for the Soviet Union, both in relative size 
(especially for individual countries such as Hungary, where 
it represents l/10 of national income) and structure. In 
fact Soviet exports to the EC consist mostly of oil, gas and 
raw materials which enter free of tariff or quota, are 
J~ Additional reasons were also.given by the EC (see 
Seeler Report) but are not very plausible: the uneven 
development level of CMEA members, which however is no more 
uneven than that of an enlarged EC; the presence of non-
European members within CMEA, which however could have been 
handled by already existing forms of association. 
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supply-determined and easily switchable to other outlets; 
Soviet manufacturing exports are modest and in low tariff 
fields, while the EE6 are trying to export to the EC 
agricultural goods (now exported to the Soviet Union) and 
low technology manufactures subject to EC protection 
(Pinder, 1988). 
These factors explain why there was never a great 
incentive for either the USSR as a CMEA prime mover or ~he 
EC to reach a comprehensive EC-CMEA agreement. Sov1.et 
interest in such an agreement, howeve:, must hav~ increased 
over time in view of several factors: J.) the persJ.stent CMEA 
economic slowdown, which made it ne~essary to rely 
increasingly on West European technolog~ J.mported no longer 
on credit but on trade; ii) the slump J.n EC-CMEA trade and 
deterioration of terms of trade in 1985-87 and the prospect 
of further trade diversion that might be g~nerat~d by the 
enlargement and unification . of the European Internal 
Market" in 1992, regardless of whether this diversion may.or 
may not be overcompensated by the boost that the net gaJ.ns 
expected by the EC (put by the Qecc~~~i Rep?r~ at ECU 200 
bn) might give to EC external trade; 1.1.7) polJ.tJ.cal.factors 
such as the new detente, Gorbachev s perestroJ.~a, or 
possibly the desire to "use these improved contac~s wJ.th the 
EC to drive a wedge between the European ComrounJ.tY and the 
United States" (Seeler Report, 1986). 
5. Prospects for EC-CMEA collaboration 
Shortly after the June 1988 Joint declaration five 
CMEA members requested official diplomatic relations with 
the EC (GDR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and the 
Soviet Union), followed by Poland; Rom~nia has not made the 
request but is involved in trade negotJ.ations all the same. 
The first five requests have been officially welcomed and 
obtained a "favourable response", a~ter the endorsement by 
the July meeting of EC roreign m±n1sters of a pro~osal by 
the EC's external relations commissioner, .Mr WJ.~ly Le 
Clercq, to widen trade talks with CMEA co~ntrJ.es.to J.nclude 
the Soviet Union; Poland's request J.S stJ.~l under 
consideration but apparently only because of J.ts later 
submission. 
These developments are not purely nominal. The EC 
has recently agreed to end quotas on Hungary's exports by 
1995; is renegotiating a 1980 trade and cooperation 
agreement with Romania, and is ne~otiating :~n industrial 
trade arrangement with CzechoslovakJ.a. There J.S no.sh~rtage 
of issues for discussion and areas for cooper~tJ.on,. the 
1970s negotiations had indicated a number o~ ~oss~ble fJ.e~ds 
for official relations: i) better statistJ.cal J.nformatJ.on 
(demanded by the EC already at the first sessions of the 
CSCE at Helsinki) about both plans (perhaps more o~ a.m~tter 
for joint committees set up by the EC and J.~dJ.vJ.dual 
countries) and actual performance; ii) plann~ng and 
forecasting; iii) standardisation, becoming m?re ~mp?rtant 
with the 1992 schemes for further standardisatJ.on wJ.thJ.n the 
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EC, iv) the environment, dramatically come to the fore since 
the Chernobyl disaster, which however would require the 
involvement of other neighbouring countries outside EC and 
CMEA (such as for instance Austria, Yugoslavia and Finland) 
and therefore might be handled better by the UN Economic 
Commission for Europe._li 
The list of possible areas for cooperation could 
be lengthened to include: i) non-tariff barriers],_~; ii) 
trade multeralisation; iii) countertrade, which thrives on 
trade constraints and may have to be reduced or regulated 
with the gradual removal of those constraints; iv) the 
extension of financial facilities, including the possible 
use of the ECU for the "financing, invoicing and payment of 
foreign trade transactions"; v) joint ventures, including 
joint EC-CMEA projects such as those mentioned in the Seeler 
Report, namely research on "the exploration of new sources 
of energy,. and notably nuclear fusion but also alternative 
sources of energy", "scientific cooperation ... provided that 
the proper necessary strategic interests of Western Europe 
are properly guaranteed", "the development of an energy 
system for the whole of Europe, particularly for the supply 
of electricity, so as to establish a major inter-European 
network of energy supplies and mutual services", 
"cooperation ... as regards reactor security and mutual aid 
in cases of reactor malfunctioning", the development of 
transport infrastructures in Europe"; possibly, also joint 
action vis a' vis the Third world. 
5. Obstacles and incentives 
The further development of EC-CMEA cooperation 
runs into a number of obstacles, which deserve further 
consideration. Mostly they are general obstacles to trade 
between different economic systems, namely the questions of 
effective reciprocity, tr.ade denial, and debt burden. 
"Effective reciprocity" of any concession and 
trade barrier reduction offered by the EC. Eastern traders 
complain about tariff and non-tariff trade barriers but - as 
long as the traditional administrative allocation of hard 
currency and trade licencing system are maintained (whether 
lA The UC-ECE was ·set up in 1947 in Geneva by the 
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations; it 
includes all European co~ntries, the USA and Canada and is 
already dealing with environmental questions as well as 
energy and transport. 
15. Tariffs are discussed within GATT, of which 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania are members 
while Bulgaria is an observer; Romania benefits from the EC 
general scheme of preferences, but Bulgaria does not because 
of its higher level of industrialisation. 
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or not state monopoly of foreign trade is dismantled) 
Western trade with the East meets a generalised, implicit, 
arbitrary and uncertain barrier. At the same time, Western 
markets are exposed to price policies which can be as 
disruptive as the most aggressive "dumping". The problem 
however is not insormountable. Usually East European 
imports are constrained by export revenues, not by demand; 
their recent and persistent trade surplus with the EC could 
be handled by EC-wide ties linking concessions to trade 
levels; there is every expectation that any reduction of 
trade barriers would be matched by higher East European 
imports or repayment of debt. Protection of EC industries 
is not a case for trade restrictions, because protection 
whenever necessary can be enacted via anti-dumping duties if 
there is actual injury to EC producersl_~. There are Western 
countries which have very close relations with a centrally 
planned economy, such as between West and East Germany1~ or 
lQ. Finder, 1988. Anti-dumping duties are applicable 
when a product is sold at less than its normal value, 
usually defined as "the comparable price actually paid or 
payable in the ordinary course of trade"; given the 
difficulty of defining the ordinary course of trade in a 
centrally planned economy, EC and GATT have used price in 
analogue country, or the existing price of an close 
substitute in the importing country. 
17. Under the EEC Treaty Protocol on German internal 
trade the GDR has tariff-free access to the FRG, so that 
many have regarded the GDR as a member of both CMEA 
(official) and the EC (unofficial). Recently West German 
circles have claimed that closer links between the two blocs 
implied abandoning the Federal Republic's pledge to seek 
reunification with East Germany (for instance, Mr Egon Bahr, 
the East-West strategist of SPD; see ~T, 5 August 1988). 
The claim does not seem to follow nece&sarily, especially in 
view of the EC "parallel" policy which cuts out CMEA 
intermediation; also, it could be argued that closer 
relations between the two blocs are a precondition for 
further progress towards closer infra-German links. 
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between Finland and the Soviet Union18; their experience 
indicates that trade relations between different economic 
systems can go much further than current EC-CMEA relations. 
"Trade denial" is built into EC-CMEA relations as 
antagonistic alliances protecting their own security and 
political systems using economic weapons to influence 
policies through threat and retaliation. The strictest 
security-minded constraint applicable to EC-CMEA is that 
administered over the last forty years by the Coordination 
Committee for Multilateral export Controls, known as CoCom, 
including all NATO countries minus Iceland plus Japan and 
operating from Paris1~. Although the implementation of 
CoCom policies is left to national authority, there is no 
reason why the EC should not formulate a policy about the 
list administered by CoCom, especially in view of the more 
accomodating policy increasingly adopted by Japan. Economic 
weaponry includes trade embargoes, asset freezing or 
impounding,~ credit and trade limits or vetoes. Economic 
sanctions are are costly to implement and are rarely 
effective. The EC participated in economic sanctions 
following Polish declaration of Martial Law (December 1981), 
imposing Community import restrictions on the Soviet Union 
worth about US$100 mn. Restrictive US policies towards the 
USSR have been costly for Europe (including boycott of 
exports of equipment for the production and transport of 
energy) and divisive, especially in view of the 
retroactivity and extra-territoriality claimed by the US. 
Economic inducements such as the FRG policy of "change by 
trade" (Wandel durch Handel) may be more effective 
(Schiavone, 1987). 
1a. Finnish-Soviet trade takes place at spot 
international prices (i.e. there is no price formula such as 
those of Bucharest or Moscow discussed above), but according 
to long medium and short term plans, and quota systems for a 
list of goods; the Finnish government is not committed to 
trade but only to do its best to ensure that trade 
corresponds to agreements. The Finnish-markka/rouble rate·: 
is effectively determined by the USSR because it is linked 
to Soviet rouble-dollar rate; "clearing roubles are 
convertible to dollars (via the Finnish markka) at the 
official Soviet dollar-rouble exchange rate for firms 
exporting to the Soviet Union" (See Oblath, 1988). Because 
of Finnish lack of control over the exchange rate, Finnish 
exports are subject to licencing (in practice only Finnish 
products containing ,less than 20 per cent imports are 
exportable). This formula for limited convertibility seems 
a useful example for others to follow in East-West and 
intra-CMEA trade, th~ugh there is no rea~on why the exchange 
rate should be in line with Soviet cross--rates. 
l.a. The peak of CoCom restrictions was reached in 1953 
when 260 items were embargoed, 90 were under quantitative 
control and 100 were under surveillance (Schiavone, 1988). 
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Another obstacle to the d~velopment of further 
relations with the EC is the burden of servicing and 
repaying CMEA debt (now of the order of about US$100 bn), 
combined with the unwillingness and/or inability to raise 
new capital, and aggravated by lack of currency 
convertibility even within CMEA and state ownership of 
national assets. Different countries are differently 
affected, and here the "parallel" approach pursued by the EC 
is bound to be appropriate; for a country like Poland, 
indebted beyond visible possibilities of redemption, joint 
EC-CMEA cooperation in debt relief and economic assistance 
may be essential to economic recovery and political 
progress; the alternative is economic and political 
involution which is the high price paid by Romania for 
reducing its debt. Occasion~l calls for a Marshall-like 
plan for Eastern Europe are best taken as expressions of the 
need for a selective and concerted East-West plan of action 
to deal with the debt problem worldwide. 
On the more positive side, there are also economic 
and political inc~ntiv~~- Th~~~ ~~~ mutual gains from an 
intensified international division of labour, especially if 
expected to last; not only conventional (static and dynamic) 
gains from trade and financial relations which may be 
expected from the reversal of the post-War trade diversion 
(see above) but also those deriving from a certain 
"systemic" complementarity between capitalist countries 
characterised by unemployed capacity and labour and 
socialist countries characterised by endemic excess 
demand2~. Gains from trade bring about mutual dependence, 
which raises the cost of conflicts and promotes peace. 
There are also two basic political incentives. The first is 
that of aiding the process of market-oriented radical reform 
and political renewal in CMEA countries, since a measure of 
economic improvement is essential to the consolidation and 
Z...Q.. 4fhis kind of complementarity has nothing to do 
with the alleged CMEA-EC complementarity as primary 
producers and industrialised countries, rightly criticised 
by Graziani, 1987. 
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progress of reform21. The second is the possibility of 
"driving a wedge" ··-between the Soviet Union and the other 
East European countries; more generally, the possibility 
"gradually to overcome the problem of the division of Europe 
and change substantially the spirit of Yalta with regard to 
the division of zones of influence and control between the 
two superpowers" (point G of the motion submitted by the 
Committee on External Economic Relations to European 
Parliament, see Seeler Report, 1988). 
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